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THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Supreme Court No. 34426
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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRZEF
Appeal From The District Court Of The
Fourth Judicial District Of The State Of Idaho,
In And For The County of Ada
D. Duff McKee -District Judge

M. Scott Keim
Deputy Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0036
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Reafy Argument
This appeal arises from the legislation that allows Administrative Decisions affecting
enforcement of court orders upon a request from the Department of Health and Welfare, seeking
to suspend an individual's driver's license as a sanction for violating a court order of support,
pursuant to the perceived authority contained within FLLSA, a legislative enactment with little
or no enforcement criteria as to the basis, duration or particular class of license holding a
property interest, compounded by the use of an Agency's definition of "good cause", later
identified in the IDAPA Rules, 16.03.03.604, which appears to provide the only "relevant"
analysis allowed by the Department to evaluate upon what basis a court order for support is not
subject to be performed. The district court, upon this Appellant's Petition for Judicial Review,
elected to affirm the license suspension sought by the Agency and endorsed the administrative
process that authorizes suspension of the license under FLLSA, and this appeal has raised a
series of aspects affecting that legislation, including the validity, constitutionality, application
and enforceability of that FLLSA enactment, and its administrative use as a replacement for
judicial enforcement of court orders.
There is no dispute over the fact the court order for support exists, and no dispute over
the fact Appellant's support obligation was partially unpaid, and that arrears had accrued under
each of those court orders, both before and after the enactment of this challenged legislation. Our
Opening Brief has identified Appellant's challenge and the issues raised regarding the FLLSA,
and this ongoing disagreement over the enforcement of this administrative decision, continues in
the assessment of these issues raised by this appeal.

The Department would urge this Court to find our appeal is without any merit, yet goes to
great length to recognize the concerns raised by Appellant, as they seek to find support for their
arguments. They begin with wanting this Court to give "considerable weight" to the
Department's limited definition of "good cause", apparently wanting this Court to equate the
"considerable weight" concept to be interpreted to mean their exclusive definition is a valid
exercise of providing substantive due process of law, when it comes to defining the allowed
reasons for exempting enforcement of FLLSA over an existing state of non-payment of support,
and has proposed this Court consider as the authority for doing so the cases of Maron v.
Donnelly Club, 135 Idaho 581, 21 P.3d 903 (2001) and JR. Simplot Co. v. Idaho State Tax
Commission, 120 Idaho 849, 820 P.2d 1206 (1991). The Department suggests such limitations
and adoption of the exclusive reasons for exemption are "reasonably related to the legislation it
was being promulgated to carry out". We respectfully disagree, as such restrictive allowance of
such limited relevant and admissible reasons of non-payment do not cover any of the logical and
realistic economic factors that exist in the real world, such as lay offs, limited skills, limited
employment opportunities, financial downturns, economic disasters, and temporary illnesses or
disabilities that cause the deficiencies in all facets of obligations to occur, and perpetuate the
delinquencies in all forms of obligations to accrue.
Economic factors are critical, and to disregard their righthl application in the legislative
scheme is only further aggravated by the imposition of an administrative order that takes away
your license to drive, the only sensible means by which the average person is able to obtain and
maintain any gainful employment to generate an income stream to pay his support and other

financial obligations. To take the license to drive a motor vehicle serves only to take away the
ability to get and to keep the job, and without the job you take away employment opportunity
and increase the deficiency and accomplish only a worse situation than before the intervention of
the Department The courts, if allowed to address these enforcement issues, would not take the
license of an individual, but rather consider the true reasons for the state of the delinquency, and
schedule the obligee to retxn for review hearings to determine his true ability to pay current
support and accrued arrearages, and use the court's inherent contempt powers to control
enforcement of its orders, and would not impose a failed concept of limiting "good cause" to
impossible situations only, but rather relate to and work within the court's ability to marshal
some level of compliance. To even suggest there is a "rational relationship", let alone a
"reasonable relation to the legislation being enforced" with the harsh sanction of a license
suspension denies logic and defies reason, and it becomes a stretch of logic in finding that it
would not go beyond the objectives to be accomplished by the purpose of the enactment. To
make the situation become one of an "all or nothing" proposition in the relation between finding
a way to force payment of child support, and being able to keep a job is not reasonable, as it
becomes an "all or nothing" proposition on the right to have a license to service the debt, and if
you can't meet the limited good cause exception, the you are defeated entirely, and that is not an
exercise of justice, equity, or fundamental fairness under the elements of substantive due process
of law.

In the context of legislation dealing with social or economic interests, this Court assumes
a deferential review. See Abe~deen-Sprin&eId Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,90,982 P.2d

914,926 (1999). In this context, substantive due process requires that legislation which deprives
a person of life, liberty, or property must have a rational basis. Id. That is, the statute must bear a
reasonable relationship to a permissible legislative objective. Id. The reason for the deprivation
must not be so inadequate that it may be characterized as an arbitrary exercise of state police
powers. Id. See also Spencer v. Kootenai County, Supreme Court of Idaho, Docket No. 33060,
March 6,2008.
The reality is that to take a driver's license by an administrative agency serves only to
make an undesirable situation a far worse situation, as you in essence are telling the person you
don't care about economic interests, you don't care if he keeps his job, and you don't care if he
becomes part of the unemployment trend. To add insult to the economic factor, you ignore
social aspects, and you are then also saying you don't care if he has to violate the law by driving,
and should he elect to do so to keep his jog, his conduct will give rise to a new crime for which
he will then be punished, despite his economic efforts to keep a job and pay bills and stay off the
unemployment rolls of the State. It is not sensible to force an individual to consider the violation
of another law, when he can't even comply with an existing court order on support.
Compounding economic disasters is not in the State's best interests. This is hardly seen as an
equitable way to achieve the objective of providing for the welfare of the people of the State of
Idaho, and serve its social and economic interests. It must be seen as purely an arbitrary exercise
of a police power, with no rational relationship to the purpose of the State's objective to serve its
best fmancial, economic and social interests.

There is no rationale in asking the court to ignore the elements of the contempt powers of
the court normally exercised in the enforcement of a court order in the traditional sense of court
compliance. The elements of intentional indifferent disregard, and the opportunity of exercising
reasonable logic to accept the reason why the individual finds himself in the current financial
situation he must address and work his way through, is the preferred course of judicial and
equitable fairness.
We urge this Court to appreciate the reality this administrative process is inherently
flawed, and a judicial review of a court order on support is the only substantive way for court
order enforcement to be addressed, as courts have inherently viewed the means and purpose of
enforcement differently than an administrative proceeding where there is a "flat out" finding of
no good cause exists under the Agency definition, and your driver's license is now suspended
indefinitely, and that becomes the end of the support issue, and level of enforcement of the order
from there on.
Where is the rational relationship to the end objective of hying to get fathers to be more
responsive to support with their contributions for the welfare and benefit of their children, when
you allow administrative rulings on the issue of cause that are so short-sighted that it eliminates
explanations of financial difficulties, and then disregard substantive due process with the
obligation to protect the property rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
The Department has expressed the idea Mr. Wheeler should have presented "facts" into
evidence to preserve his right to raise his issues as to good cause on appeal. That argument is
neither logical nor consistent with the promulgated administrative rules or the purpose

announced in the notification for the hearing. The individual is "told" in the "Notice of
Suspension" what qualifies for "good cause", and nowhere does the Department invite or allow
an individual to produce evidence by going outside the Department's definition of good case, as
a requirement to preserve a challenge to the wrongfulness of that administrative process. The
proposed evidence of a licensee, outside the Agency definition, would be irrelevant to the cause,
and it becomes inadmissible to the purpose of the hearing, and the Department has no basis to
now argue or suggest Mr. Wheeler had an obligation to produce "irrelevant" and "inadmissible"
evidence at a hearing, as it only serves to ask Mr. Wheeler to ignore the administrative process
and disregard the rules that he must abide by, if he wants to challenge the process. It is illogical
to require Mr. Wheeler to present irrelevant and inadmissible facts, as a basis or condition to
challenge the substantive due process, reasonableness of the law, its relationship of good cause to
the purpose of the legislation, the constitutionality of the enactment, and the infringement upon
his constitutional rights under the structure of this FLLSA enactment and the definitions
contained in the Agency rules.
The Department argues FLLSA was designed to include a driver's license as being
justifiably within the reach of the Department's right to infringe upon its issuance, and take that
right away &om an individual. We must respectfully disagree that FLLSA has that effect by the
language used, as a driver's license would appear to be regarded a "property right" or a "property
interest", and must be exempted by virtue of part (d) of the enactment, which specifically says
what license is subject to suspension. It must be a license that does not constitute a property
interest. Was that meant to mean only a water right, or only a mineral interest in real property?

Why didn't the legislature expressly define what it was meant to be by the use of the phrase
"property interest"?
The debate is now over whether that was meant to include what is a driver's license.
That matter of definition was thought to have been decided in the Adams case rendered in 1966,
which we rely upon as demonstrating a proposition a driver's license constitutes a property right
or property interest, as a matter of case law. Adams specifically provides "the right to operate a
motor vehicle upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right or
liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the Federal and State
Constitutions". See Adams v. City ofPocatello, 91 Idaho 99, 101,416 P.2d 46,48 (1966).
The guarantees under the constitution are often characterized as "property rights",
"liberty interests", or "property interests" and "liberty rights", depending on the context of the
discussion, whose saying it, and in what context. At the very least, a driver's license, under
Idaho law, is not a "mere privilege", and is a "protected" and "guaranteed" "right" under Federal
and State Constitutions. Can you simply ineinge upon a protected and guaranteed right,
preserved in the Constitution with an administrative ruling that suspends it upon an Agency
basis, and if you can, are you allowed to do so

lowing

substantive due process of law, inherent in the enforcement of all court orders?
Where is the statutory procedural or substantive "due process" in this administrative
process that allows the Agency to take a right as defined, when in the statute it says you cannot
take that which constitutes a property interest; where is that needed substantive due process in

this statute when it does not define the basis upon what constitutes cause to take or not to take
the right or interest?
We understand FLLSA came into being, and by now recognized by all, as an attempt to
secure the right to receive the Federal grants to provide welfare for families under the Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families Program (TANF). Idaho was faced with the need to demonstrate
some level of compliance with 42 U.S.C.

8 666(a)(16). It created this enactment as a way to

retain a right to receive grants, but should it be allowed to disregard substantive due process,
override the Adams case, and sidestep judicial proceedings with non-legislative administrative
rulings and definitions that ignore the contempt powers of the court and eliminate the critical
review of the elements of willfkdness required in traditional analysis for the enforcement of court
orders?
The Department wants to preserve the use of this legislation, apparently to preserve its

i

right to receive grants, but has it proven over time to be even remotely related to the purpose that

I

I

was objectively being sought to be achieved to get more child support from fathers when you add
to unemployment and take the enforcement of court orders out of the court from where they were

rulings.
The legislation is flawed; its enforcement has left us with a poor choice of available
venues, and the good cause used has resulted in a situation that contradicts case authority and
I

required elements of due process, and is being enforced in a way that preempts the rational

I

enforcement of judicial orders with the proper oversight of judicial proceedings.

This Appellant's license must be reinstated, and should FLLSA not be ruled
unconstitutional and unenforceable as written, with respect to a driver's license, and if construed
to be enforceable in any fashion, we do urge this Court to find it must be enforced only in a
judicial setting, and allow for judicial proceedings, and Appellant would then request the matter
be remanded in such a manner as to allow Appellant the alternative avenue of proceeding in a
judicial proceeding, to address his fin
compliance with the l a w l l enforcement of
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